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TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: JUSTICE POWELL AND JUSTICE
MARSHALL’S PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATION AND THE LAW
ADREANNE STEPHENSON∗
INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of a Supreme Court Justice is one of eclectic tides. Various
experiences impact a justice’s interpretation and application of precedent. Even
though the black robe symbolizes impartiality, experience colors judicial opinions.
Experience shapes the lens from which we view the world and it also shapes how
judges determine what the law is.1 Complex in its composition, jurisprudence
embodies the obscurity of individual experience, review of precedent and
interpretation of statutes.
This Note will examine how Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s individual experiences affected their jurisprudence concerning
educational issues. Part I will provide a brief biography of each Justice, relaying
the experiences that shed light on their education perspective. Even though they
were both southerners who served simultaneously—Justice Powell was appointed
in 1972, retired in 1987, and Justice Marshall was appointed in 1967, retired in
1991—their jurisprudential perspectives were much farther than their seats on the
bench. Their different lives placed them on two sides of the societal coin, Justice
Powell on the “white privilege” side and Marshall on the “Negro inferiority” side.
Their vastly unique perspectives and the Brown v. Board of Education2 decision
made the 1970s and 1980s an exciting time for education reform.
Part II will contrast the Justices’ views on mandated busing as a remedy for
integration. Justice Powell believed court mandated busing was unconstitutional,
significantly disrupted education, and imposed on local officials’ responsibility to
integrate. Conversely, Justice Marshall felt that forced busing was a constitutional
means to integrate a divided society maintained by local segregation. Part III will
contrast the Justices’ views on educational funding schemes. Once again, the two
Justices found themselves on different sides of the same coin and held opposing
views on how the Equal Protection Clause should apply to Texas’s educational
funding scheme. Justice Powell trusted school boards to make reasonable and fair
funding schemes without the imposition of the court. Justice Marshall did not trust
∗ B.S., College of William & Mary, 2011; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2014. Thank you to the
Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple for all of his guidance and expertise on this Note.
1
See generally, Angela Nicole Johnson, Note, Intersectionality, Life Experience & Judicial
Decisionmaking: A New View of Gender at the Supreme Court, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
353 (2014).
2 37 U.S. 483 (1954).
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local regimes because racism was still prevalent in American society.
Part IV will focus on the transition from racial integration to rectification as the
Court grappled with defining ‘equality’ and the constitutionality of implementing
affirmative action programs. Powell recognized the history of discrimination,
however, the history could not justify racial preference programs in perpetuity,
especially when it infringed on reasonable expectations of innocent individuals.
Marshall believed integration should be accomplished by any means necessary
because historical discrimination usurped many opportunities for blacks and
integration would ameliorate America’s bleak history. Part V will discuss Powell
and Marshall’s differing viewpoints on affirmative action admissions programs best
illustrated in Regents of University of California v. Bakke. Taking a more textual
approach, Powell believed race could be one consideration for admission, but racial
preferential programs should be phased out in the near future to ensure equality for
all. Taking a more historical and legislative intent approach, Marshall believed
preferential racial programs were a necessity to ameliorate past and present
discrimination that remains prevalent in our society. By applying the Justices’
arguments in Bakke and jurisprudential patterns to the affirmative action case
currently under consideration by the Supreme Court, Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin, this Note will predict their decisions as if they were still on the bench.
I. TWO ROADS DIVERGED IN A YELLOW WOOD:3 THE JUSTICES’
BACKGROUNDS
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. was born in Suffolk, Virginia in 1907 and grew up
in Richmond, Virginia.4 He received his bachelors and law degree from
Washington and Lee University. As a product of the Old South, Powell attended all
white schools, lived in a household with all black servants, and harbored the
mentality that blacks were inferior. Like many Southern whites, he never
questioned this way of life especially in Virginia where segregation was the status
quo.5 In 1954, after Brown “condemned a way of life,”6 partners at Powell’s law
firm, Hunton and Williams, represented Prince Edward County in Allen v. County
School Board.7 Powell’s colleagues persuaded the district court to uphold “separate
but equal” schools because it would not be practical to implement integration
immediately.8 Interestingly, Justice Thurgood Marshall was opposing counsel in
the case and persuaded the Fourth Circuit to reverse. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion
forced the county to integrate with “deliberate speed” as the Supreme Court set out
in Brown.
3. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, POEMHUNTER, http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/the-road-nottaken/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
4. JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 16, 139 (1994).
5. Id. at 139.
6. Id. at 131.
7. 249 F.2d 462, 463 (4th Cir. 1957).
8. JEFFRIES, supra note 2, at 139.
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As a firm believer in precedent, Powell “thought the constitutionality of
segregation was conclusively established by long acceptance.”9 He even stated in a
letter that the segregation cases in regards to “the school decisions were wrongly
decided.”10 As a man in his early fifties when Brown was decided, the mentality of
black inferiority had permeated his psyche for a half-century. According to Powell,
he would “never favor compulsory integration” because desegregation cases were
contrary to constitutional precedent and social policy.11 However, Powell’s
discontent with the Brown decision reflected not only his segregated past but also
his grassroots philosophy. Powell’s bottom-up belief in change differed from the
top-down approach used by the Court to implement integration. Issuing such a
pervasive precedent, that infiltrated school boards across the nation, from the aloof
and disconnected Supreme Court, displeased Powell. He disapproved the Court’s
overreaching decision to change social policy.
As a leader in his community, Powell spurred local education reform in
Richmond, Virginia. Powell was appointed to the Richmond school board in 1950
and served as chairman for eight years beginning in 1952.12 After serving the local
school board, he was appointed to the State Board of Education. Education reform
was important to Powell because his Uncle Ned, a teacher, nurtured Powell’s deep
affection for learning and scholarship. His father, Louis Sr., influenced Powell’s
appreciation of education as the key to economic success.13 In Richmond, Powell
reformed education by improving the sciences, mathematics, foreign languages, and
international politics programs in response to the Space Race. Moreover, he
augmented teacher salaries and built new schools.14 Despite the positive reform,
Powell’s service on the school board was not perfect.
During Powell’s time on the board, the system of segregated schools was still
intact.15 Throughout Powell’s tenure, dual attendance zones for “white” and
“Negro” schools were maintained despite the school board’s authority to assign
black and white pupils to the same schools and help facilitate integration.16
Moreover, the obvious solution of rezoning children from overcrowded “Negro”
schools to under-enrolled white schools was diverted and the school board opted to
build additional black schools instead. The Court in Bradley v. School Board17 held
the school board responsible for preserving a discriminatory scheme because it had
not changed the dual attendance system or the feeder school system.18 Powell’s
9. Id.
10. Id. at 140.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 160.
14. Id. at 163−67.
15. Id. at 141.
16. Id.
17. 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
18. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 141. Because of the dual attendance system, black children walked past
white schools to attend designated “Negro Schools.” In the feeder school system, after a child was assigned
to a particular school, the child progressed through a pattern from white elementary to white junior high to
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reaction to Brown’s mandate to integrate with “all deliberate speed” was the
issuance of a press release stating the Richmond school board’s decision to wait for
Virginian law to reflect on integration.19 The press release was not Powell’s only
successful dodge of integration, but he also acted similarly during his service on the
State School Board. Within the first year of his appointment, the board issued
regulations authorizing local school boards to resume control of pupil placement as
directed by the General Assembly.20 The shift in responsibility allowed Powell to
dodge the issue of segregation once again leaving the localities, counties, and city
school boards with the issue of integration.21 From his silence, one would think
Powell agreed with the status quo. However, Powell was a man of many layers.
Behind the muteness, Powell actually held a more positive view of integration.
Despite the fact that Powell’s children attended all-white private schools and his
firm fought to delay integration efforts, segregation was a point of contention for
Powell.22 As an Officer of the Court who held the law at the utmost respect, he
wanted Virginia to proceed in good faith to implement Brown, despite the lack of
popularity.23 He disapproved—but hesitantly voted for—public tuition grants used
to fund all white private education.24 The private school scheme sustained
segregation since privately owned establishments were not required to integrate;
therefore, public schools became designated “black schools” and private schools
became designated “white schools.” The private tuition grants maintained the
unconstitutional dual system banned by the Supreme Court. Even though Powell
appeared to facilitate segregation while on the school board, he performed discrete
acts that proved he was a proponent of integration.
In 1956, Virginia considered applying the doctrine of interposition, which
asserted the right of states to declare federal actions unconstitutional, to the Brown
decision.25 Powell vehemently opposed the lawless notion of interposition because
Virginia did not have a right to find the Supreme Court’s decision “null, void and of
no effect.”26 His four arguments against interposition included: 1) interposition was
the unconstitutional doctrine of nullification; 2) chaos would amount if the states
could decide for itself the constitutionality of federal actions; 3) nullification
essentially began the Civil War and due to its historical background is invalid; 4)
the radical position disrespected law and order and should be disregarded instead of
damage the Supreme Court’s authority. Powell pronounced, “[i]t seems obvious
that we cannot expect to preserve our cherished institutions and maintain their
positions of public respect and confidence, if we praise them only when their
white high school, or from black elementary to black junior high to black high school.
19. Id. at 143.
20. Id. at 169.
21. Id. at 169−170.
22. Id. at 160.
23. Id. at 145.
24. Id. at 174.
25. Id. at 145.
26. Id. at 147.
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actions please us and defy and denounce them when their actions displease us.”27
Despite Powell’s campaign against interposition and Richmond school board’s
open opposition to massive resistance, Virginia launched an entire campaign
against the Brown decision by closing schools to prevent desegregation. However,
Powell’s efforts were not futile because he continued to advocate against massive
resistance in political spaces and eventually Virginians began to listen. Powell
helped prepare a presentation at the Rotunda Club for the governor, attorney
general, lieutenant governor and reporters. Through the presentation, Powell
expressed the many cons of massive resistance and its effect on Virginia’s industry,
reputation, and community.28 Powell emphasized the correlation between the
school crisis, economic downfall, and lack of industrial development urging
Virginia to integrate before it spurred into an economic depression. He argued that
United States citizens would not move to a state that closed schools and acted
unlawfully against the highest court of the nation.29 Support of massive resistance
quickly dwindled30 after the Rotunda presentation, marking a key event in
Virginia’s history.31
Powell was not considered a leader in integration, but he fostered a more
accepting political environment for integration in Virginia. His passion and
dedication to public education in Richmond was insurmountable and every year
after Brown, Powell began to accept, embrace, and advocate for integration.32 Who
knew that the same Southern gentleman who grew up in an era of racial divide
would one day swear in Douglas Wilder, the first black governor of Virginia and
the United States? With great effervescence Powell proclaimed, “It’s a great day
for Virginia!”33
Even though Justice Powell and Justice Thoroughgood34 “Thurgood” Marshall
lived only one hundred and fifty miles from one another, they led very different
lives. Growing up in Baltimore, Maryland in the segregated South, Marshall only
attended all black schools and constantly dealt with whites’ open hostility toward
Negroes. Marshall attended Lincoln University, also known as the “Black
Princeton,” for undergrad and Howard University, a historically black college, for
law school.35 Thurgood Marshall was greatly influenced by the strength of his
mother, Norma Marshall, and the bold inquisitiveness of his father, William
Marshall. Interestingly, William Marshall became the first black man to serve on a
27. Id. at 148.
28. Id. at 151−52; Interview with Virginius Dabney, Retired Editor, Richmond Times-Dispatch (July 31,
1975) (transcript available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/sohp/A-0311-2/A-0311-2.html).
29. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 152.
30. Interview with Virginius Dabney, supra note 28.
31. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 151−53.
32. Id. at 176.
33. Id. at 181−82.
34. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 176 (1994). As a young child, Marshall’s first name,
‘Thoroughgood’ was shortened to ‘Thurgood,’ making it easier for second grade Marshall to spell.
35. Id. at 179 (explaining that Marshall attended Howard since the University of Maryland in Baltimore
did not admit blacks).
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grand jury in Baltimore and had the race question omitted from consideration by the
grand jury. This strong sense of black pride and respect for the courts encouraged
Thurgood Marshall to pursue a career in law. Through law, he could help bring
blacks out of the somber predicament of racial inequality and inferiority. One
principle iterated by his father was: “Anyone calls you nigger, you not only got my
permission to fight him—you got my orders to fight him.”36 Even though Marshall
did not take his father’s principle to heart literally, he did figuratively by working
hard in law school, engaging in tireless litigation, and continuing the fight against
Negro inferiority.
Post-law school and during the Great Depression, Thurgood Marshall opened a
practice, which did not receive much business. The dearth of black lawyers,
approximately twelve in Baltimore, did not receive support from the black
community because black attorneys lacked societal influence.37 Even when work
did come, it was usually pro bono. By representing poor clients, he eventually
acquired a good reputation throughout the community.38 In 1934, Marshall became
very involved with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) by providing legal counsel to the Baltimore branch and arguing
cases that moved toward equality for blacks in America.39 From arguing against
segregated universities to suing school boards to increase black teachers’ salaries,
Marshall began making his mark on education through litigation. Much of
Marshall’s work in education involved chipping away at the “separate but equal”
doctrine founded in Plessy v. Ferguson.40 Using constitutionally based arguments,
Marshall constantly undermined the “equal” prong by exposing unequal differences
between white and black institutions regarding curricula, faculty, equipment, and
facilities. Thurgood Marshall, Charles H. Houston,41 and William I. Gosnell42
36. Id. at 177.
37. Id. at 182 (Marshall would soon debunk the myth that black attorneys did not have societal
influence).
38. Id. at 182.
39. Id. at 184.
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. NAACP History: Charles Hamilton Houston, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-historycharles-hamilton-houston (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). Charles Hamilton Houston was a black lawyer who
trained Thurgood Marshall, argued many civil rights cases between 1930 and 1956, and served as special
counsel to the NAACP. He attended Harvard Law School and became the first African-American editor of
the Harvard Law Review. His main goal through litigation was to demonstrate how the states failed in
maintaining “separate but equal” facilities in that officials only held true to the separate prong not the equal
requirement.
42. F. Michael Higginbotham & Jose F. Anderson, William I. Gosnell: Brown’s Unsung Hero, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (July 6, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2048657.
Gosnell attended the University of Chicago law school and received scholarship under the same program as
Pearson to attend an out of state school. He served as the legal director of the NAACP in Pearson v. Murray
and encouraged Murray—the plaintiff—to challenge the segregation policy by writing a letter to the president
of the university, Raymond Pearson, and suing if he was not accepted. Though Gosnell specialized in
commercial litigation such as real-estate and probate, he continued to fight for civil rights by arguing Durkee
v. Murphy, 29 A.2d 253 (1942), where the plaintiff sued Baltimore City for its limitations of black players on
certain courses and inferior facilities of black golf courses as compared to white courses. This case spurred
litigation about integrating golf courses throughout the country. See also MARVIN P. DAWKINS & GRAHAM C.
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argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required the state to provide equal treatment
in public funded facilities and refrain from denying one race a right possessed by
another race.43
In the beginning, Marshall used the cost analysis to advocate for desegregation
emphasizing that, “the best overall strategy seemed to be an attack against the
segregation system by law suits . . . on the theory that the extreme cost of
maintaining two ‘equal’ school systems would eventually destroy segregation.”44
Even under the “separate but equal” principle, providing separate medical schools,
law schools, and graduate school programs for blacks that offered the same benefits
as state schools for whites placed exorbitant costs on state governments. Moreover,
creating separate entities for the small number of Negro citizens in the country was
a waste of resources. Marshall successfully used the economic theory in Pearson v.
Murray, where a highly qualified black man was denied admission to the University
of Maryland’s law school solely because of his race. Since there was not an
alternative law school in Maryland for blacks, the state gave blacks a $200
scholarship to attend an out-of-state black law school. This case in particular was
dear to Marshall because he had considered attending the University of Maryland’s
law school in Baltimore. He decided not to apply because of Maryland’s Jim Crow
laws, took the scholarship given by the state, and commuted an hour to Howard
University, which proved very expensive.45 In Pearson, the court held that equal
treatment could only be furnished in the one Maryland law school provided by the
state and granted the black petitioner admission.46 The opinion discussed the cost
of attending Howard compared to the University of Maryland even though
Howard’s tuition was sixty-eight dollars cheaper than the University of Maryland.
Commuting costs, the cost of living in Washington D.C., and moving expenses
augmented the cost associated with out-of-state attendance at a black private
school; the exorbitant costs were evidence of unequal treatment.47 It was
unconstitutional for Maryland to essentially use other states’ schools to educate its
citizens. Other states were expending their financial resources building Negro
schools while the state of Maryland relinquished its responsibility to furnish a
“separate but equal” law school for black citizens.
Though the economic argument was successful in Pearson, it did not prove
very successful in litigating segregation cases generally. In response to the
NAACP’s cases against University of Missouri, Tennessee, North Carolina, and
Kentucky, states continued to create Jim Crow law schools and graduate programs

KINLOCH, AFRICAN AMERICAN GOLFERS DURING THE JIM CROW ERA 138 (2000).
43. Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 593 (Md. 1936).
44. Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in Education
Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO. EDUC. 318 (1952).
45. KLUGER, supra note 34, at 179 (commuting was so expensive that Marshall worked numerous jobs
to pay for school expenses and his mother even sold her engagement ring and wedding band to help with
costs).
46. Pearson, 182 A. at 593.
47. Id.
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with the promise of striving for equality.48 After bleak success in invalidating
discriminatory graduate programs, Marshall’s strategy began to transform as he
moved from the graduate school arena to the elementary school arena to attack
segregation. Using an amalgamation of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and
constitutional law, he persuaded the Court that separate could never be equal.
The transformation from the economic argument to the social science argument
is best viewed in Sweatt v. Painter.49 Marshall mentioned that the facts in Sweatt v.
Painter, would have supported the economic argument because the University of
Texas assumed the plaintiff would challenge the equality of the Jim Crow law
school compared to the white law school. Therefore, Texas appropriated
$2,600,000 to build a new Negro university and allotted $500,000 per year for the
new school’s upkeep. Even though the reaction of the Texas legislature supported
the theory that segregation was more expensive than integration, Marshall did not
use the economic argument to win the case. Instead, he tackled desegregation head
on.50 Marshall convinced the Supreme Court of the United States to hold that the
Equal Protection Clause required the petitioner’s admission into the white
university. Marshall used anthropology and legal experts, who testified that race
did not impact a child’s ability to learn and that equal facilities did not presume
equal educational opportunities. Here, in Painter, his use of social science that
would ultimately win Brown began to surface. Marshall argued that the University
of Texas Law School had certain subjective qualities, such as faculty reputation,
administrative experience, alumni position and influence, community, and prestige
that made it a better institution than the Jim Crow school. In addition to subjective
qualities, the Court noted that law is a profession that requires interactive learning.
“[T]he interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned”51 was nonexistent in the Jim Crow law school since the petitioner
would not have the opportunity to engage with Texan lawyers—most of which
attend the University of Texas. Without intellectual stimulation and discussion
with students of varying backgrounds, the petitioner would not receive an equal
education.52 Though the Court did not overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, this case was
another step toward its inevitable overturn by Brown.
Justice Marshall’s reaction to Brown was very different from Justice Powell’s.
As a target of racial discrimination and a passionate advocate for black people,
Marshall saw how the adversarial system improved college and graduate program
acceptance rates of black students. Marshall “demanded that the Court fix a date
48. Marshall, supra note 44, at 318−19 (referencing the Gaines and Bluford case where two African
Americans were not admitted to the University of Missouri).
49. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
50. Marshall, supra note 44, at 319.
51. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
52. Essentially, the Court argued that diversity is a compelling interest for exposing the black petitioner
to the diverse thought found in the all-white law school. Ironically, this argument would be used seventy-three
years later, at the same university to argue that exposing white students to the diverse thought of minority
students is a compelling interest in having affirmative action admissions programs. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at
Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 227 (5th Cir. 2011).
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for the end of segregation in the schools” after the Brown decision.53 Though
impractical since segregation plagued the American lifestyle for over three hundred
years, a fixed date would quickly initiate desegregation efforts and incentivize state
governments to enforce the Supreme Court’s mandate. The Court’s decision was a
hard pill to swallow, but Marshall believed the top-down approach was the best way
to spur integration. Conversely, Powell waited for the Virginia legislature to
address the issue even though his influence on the school board could have quickly
facilitated change. As a grassroots proponent, Powell advocated for a more gradual
change where local governments developed innovative integration plans without
creating massive upheaval. According to Powell, the decision applied pressure to
integrate and the depth of its mandate would automatically spur education reform.
Fixing a date would be difficult and quite unnecessary.
Even though both men viewed Brown differently, the combination of their
ideals propelled integration efforts. Years after the Brown decision, both Justices’
perspectives seemed to evolve. In 1960, Marshall had a staggering confession,
which juxtaposed his militant idea to fix a date for desegregation. He began to
favor a more practical approach realizing that “old habits die hard.” Integration did
not move as swiftly as Marshall hoped, but the courtroom served as a venue to
place racial issues on the forefront of America’s political agenda. Marshall
believed that Brown and other desegregation cases would not ultimately integrate
school systems, but they acted as a “holding action,” opening the door to address
the disconnect between education reform and race relations.54 The ultimate
solution to integration “w[ould] only [happen] when the Negro t[ook] his part in the
community, voting and otherwise.”55 Here, during Marshall’s epiphany, Powell’s
school of thought and Marshall’s practical sensibilities met at a crossroad. Powell
and Marshall agreed that efforts within the local communities were essential to
implementing desegregation. Marshall realized that the final solution did not solely
lie within the black community, but in blacks’ participation in the greater
community on a grassroots level.
As a proponent for changing social policy through litigation, Justice Marshall
recognized that Brown’s urgency initiated education reform around the nation.
Though a grassroots man at heart, Justice Powell realized that the judiciary’s power
was focused in its ability to flag important issues in the community, place them on
the public agenda, and spur robust conversation and debate in the media,
classrooms, workplaces, and social settings.56 Here Marshall’s school of thought
and Powell’s realizations about Brown met at another crossroad. The ritualistic
confines of litigation initiated change and increased awareness. The less formal
interactions in the community mobilized individuals, forced action, and
53. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS
83 (Oxford University Press 2001).
54. Id. at 118.
55. Id.
56. TIMOTHY J. O’NEILL, BAKKE & THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: FRIENDS AND FOES IN THE CLASSROOM
OF LITIGATION 256 (Wesleyan University Press 1985).
TROUBLED LEGACY
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implemented change as well. Powell was correct in that community leaders were
not reading the Supreme Court’s one hundred and fifty page opinions, but they
discussed the topics considered by the Court and helped create solutions that
progressed towards greater equality for all.
Even though their thoughts met at a crossroad throughout their time on the
bench, the nuances that made their jurisprudences different often placed them on
opposite sides of an opinion. Powell trusted community efforts more than Marshall
and their opposing views on education reform were evident from many opinions.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BUSING
“[T]his Court should not require school boards to engage in the unnecessary
transportation away from their neighborhoods . . . It is at [the elementary] age level
that neighborhood education performs its most vital role.”
Justice Lewis Powell, in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 251
(1973).
“To suggest, as does the majority, that a Detroit-only [busing] plan somehow
remedies the effects of de jure segregation of the races is, in my view, to make a
solemn mockery of Brown I’s holding that separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal . . . .”
Justice Thurgood Marshall, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 809 (1974).
Eight months before Powell was sworn in on January 7, 1972, the Supreme
Court of the United States unanimously held in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education57 that district courts have the authority to override school board
integration plans and create remedies to insure racially mixed schools. Based on
the school board’s statutory history of upholding a dual enrollment system and
Brown’s demand to desegregate “with all deliberate speed,” grouping noncontiguous school zones and busing students to different parts of the city were
appropriate tools for integrating public schools. As long as the time or distance of
travel was not so great as to cause a health risk or impinge on the educational
process, the remedial measures were deemed constitutional.58
Powell was not pleased with the Swann holding.59 He abhorred busing and his
qualms with Swann were revealed in his part concurring and part dissenting opinion
in Keyes v. School District No. 1.60 In Keyes, the plaintiffs claimed the school
board engaged in racial segregation by manipulating school zoning and school site
selection while enforcing neighborhood policies that kept schools racially
separated. Since Denver’s school board did not have a statutory dual system, like
57.
58.
59.
60.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 30.
JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 282−83.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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many Southern states post-Brown, the petitioners had to prove that Denver engaged
in systematic segregation creating a dual system or that Denver engaged in de jure
segregation by proving 1) the existence of segregated schools, and 2) the state’s
intention to maintain segregation.61 Much of the majority’s argument was
formulated around Swann’s premise: the difference between de jure segregation—
the unconstitutional separation by law—and de facto segregation—the
constitutional separation without government responsibility—was intent. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a school board could rebut the prima facie case of de jure
segregation with clear and convincing evidence that justified its actions.62
The majority in Keyes, which Marshall joined, remanded the case to the district
court for several reasons. The Court believed evidence of “feeder” schools,
segregated school zones, and student transfers of black children to black schools
and white children to white schools could prove the existence of a dual system.63 It
held that discovering intentionally segregative actions by the school board created a
presumption that “other segregated schooling within the system [was] not
adventitious.”64 Since the Court found intentional segregation in some of the
schools at issue, segregative intent was proved and on remand, the school board had
to rebut the prima facie case and show that the racially motivated policies were not
created to preserve segregation. Though this case is not a busing case, Powell was
very strategic in expressing his constitutional arguments about desegregation and
voicing his opinions on busing.
In his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion, Powell addressed the
necessity of abandoning the de jure and de facto distinction emphasized in Swann
and the majority in Keyes. The distinction only created different standards for
Southern and Northern states. Swann found that a state with “a long history” of
statutorily imposed apartheid automatically engaged in de jure segregation.
Therefore, intent was not a requirement in the prima facie case against a Southern
state. In essence, racial separation without a history of statutory segregation did not
violate constitutional rights.65 Under this regime, Northern cities escaped
chastisement by hiding in the shadows of de facto segregation and public resistance
of the segregated South.66 Powell found it unfair that Northern cities with heavy
concentrations of minorities and segregated schools had to prove intent since they
did not have a “history” of statutorily imposed segregation. In fact, many Northern
states discarded their statutes before Brown67 was decided but continued to practice
segregation. Therefore, Northern states did have a history of statutorily imposed

61. Id. at 192 n.4, 198 (listing the core city schools).
62. Id. at 208−10.
63. Id. at 201−02.
64. Id. at 208.
65. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
66. JEFFRIES, supra note 4, at 291.
67. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), held that state compelled or authorized segregation of public schools
violates the Fourteenth Amendment and Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) held that the state must take
affirmative action to desegregate public schools.
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segregation.
Powell asserted that segregated schools in biracial metropolitan areas, whether
Northern or Southern, “did not result from historic, state-imposed de jure
segregation . . . [but from] segregated residential and migratory patterns . . . of
which [were] . . . perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public school
authorities.”68 However, Powell’s statement is untrue. The generally accepted
notion in many metropolitan areas during the 1970’s was that “school officials’
practices may have [had] a substantial impact upon housing patterns . . . .”69 The
dictionary defines ‘perpetuate’ as “continuing without intermission or
interruption.”70 Powell’s statement portrayed school officials as passive bystanders
rather than active participants in school segregation. School segregation in
metropolitan areas was a product of segregated housing while complacent school
boards lurked in the shadows of racism. This cannot be true when school boards
were key players in deterring black students from attending white schools in
metropolitan areas even after Brown I. School boards could no longer rely on Jim
Crow laws and racist state Constitutions because it was their duty to eliminate
segregation “root and branch.”71 Many metropolitan school boards decided to act
contradictory to the mandate and implemented covert segregation tactics instead of
integration solutions.
For instance, in Kansas City (“KC”), a hyper-segregated metropolitan area, the
school board shifted attendance zones to bus white students past black schools to
white schools on the west side of the city.72 Through segregative practices, the
school board flagged racially identifiable schools for whites which contributed to
the maintenance of segregated neighborhoods.”73 School board officials in KC did
not merely perpetuate segregation, but actively refused to implement busing,
equalize funding across districts, and change school boundaries to facilitate
integration. In the 1960s, KC rejected a plan to build a series of integrated middle
schools and implemented an “intact busing” program where black students were
bused to white schools, but were segregated within the program. Therefore, black
students learned in separate classrooms, had recess at a different time, and ate lunch
on a different schedule from the white students.74 West side busing system, lack of
corrective remedies, and “intact busing” arrangements were ways KC hid under the
umbrella of de facto segregation. Metropolitan segregation methods “belie[d] any
notion that the historical development of racial segregation in schools and housing
was ‘natural,’ accidental, immutable, or caused by remote and uncontrollable

68. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222−23 (emphasis added).
69. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 470 (D. Mass. 1974).
70. Perpetuate, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perpetual?s=t (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013).
71. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437−38 (1968).
72. Kevin Fox Gotham, Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School Segregation and
Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 43 AMER. STUDIES 5, 6, 18 (2002).
73. Id. at 5, 18, 20, 22.
74. Intact busing is basically the unconstitutional idea of “separate but equal.”
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demographic forces or migration processes.”75 Local school board officials not
only perpetuated but also explicitly created racially segregated school systems
regardless of housing structure.76
Similarly in Boston, Massachusetts, the figures showed starkly segregated
schools due to the board’s implementation of feeder patterns and segregated
enrollment programs.77 Boston’s use of open enrollment programs—where parents
could opt out of their neighborhood school to choose a different—racially
homogeneous—school, exacerbated racial segregation by contributing to the dual
school system.78 In 1971, Boston adopted the controlled transfer policy to replace
open enrollment. The controlled transfer policy allowed students to transfer to a
school outside their neighborhood or zoning district only when there were open
seats available.79 However, the controlled transfer policy had many exceptions,
which essentially swallowed the rule. First, the grandfather clause allowed students
who attended out of district schools to continue attending if a seat remained open.
Second, it allowed those students, who applied the previous year but were not
accepted to an out of district school, to transfer to an out of district school of their
choice the next year. The third exception allowed brothers and sisters of transfer
students to gain access to out of district schools. Fourth, transfers were granted
within a multi-school district. Lastly, the catchall exception, or the hardship clause,
ironically allowed transfers on the basis of racial grounds and without showing
parental hardship.80 Boston’s school board even built small schools to serve
classified racial groups and the neighborhood concept was only used in
overwhelmingly segregated residential areas.81 In Morgan v. Hennigan, Boston’s
schools argued that segregated housing and migration of the black population to the
city was responsible for segregation. Similar to Powell’s support of the
neighborhood system in Keyes, Boston argued that the neighborhood policy was
constitutional despite segregative effects. However, Boston’s implementation of
the controlled transfer system, extensive busing to racially segregated schools, and
feeder patterns were anti-neighborhood policies since they intentionally placed
students in schools outside their neighborhoods. Boston could not use the
neighborhood concept to mask its segregative acts, especially since they were
removing white children from their neighborhood schools and busing them across
the city to white schools. In this instance, housing patterns did not cause school
segregation; the school board’s active role in keeping schools segregated was the
essential link.

75. Gotham, supra note 72, at 5, 29−30.
76. See also GERALD W. HEANEY & SUSAN UCHITELLE, UNENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG ROAD TO AN
EQUAL EDUCATION IN ST. LOUIS 71−82 (2004) (explaining the continued segregation of education after
Brown in the metropolitan area of St. Louis, Missouri).
77. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974).
78. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 590 (1st Cir. 1974).
79. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. at 449 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 454−55 (explaining all the exceptions of the controlled transfer policy).
81. Id. at 479.
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Nashville, Tennessee, and Chicago, Illinois, were two other metropolitan areas
with boards that actively segregated schools. In the late 1950s, Nashville contained
overlapping districts of white and black schools in the city proper, but there
remained segregated schools even though white and black families lived in close
proximity.82 Since one third of the counties in Nashville did not offer public high
schools for blacks, some black students had to pay tuition and commute to all-black
facilities in another county.83 The Nashville school board was not eliminating
segregation “root and branch” but rather opposed integration vehemently. The
school board even denied a request of two white professors at Fisk University—the
only unsegregated college in Nashville—who asked permission to enroll their
children in black schools near the university.84 Even though community members
tried to progress toward integration, Nashville’s board stood firm in hindering
advancement. Chicago’s school board did more than just “perpetuate” school
segregation by setting up mobile classrooms—called ‘Willis Wagons’—as a
solution to overcrowded black schools. The school board could have facilitated
integration by sending black students to nearby under-enrolled white schools, but
they did not. Coined after Chicago’s school superintendent who served from 1953
to 1966, Willis Wagons hindered black children’s access to “good” schools and
facilitated segregation via school board action.85
Intentionally circumventing the holdings of Brown, metropolitan school boards
played an active role in causing segregated schools and implementing segregative
policies. Despite evidence on the contrary, Powell claimed school officials were
mere bystanders, only perpetuating the difficult situation of segregated housing.
Due to Powell’s past service on the school board, he was sympathetic to school
officials, who were in the midst of racial unrest and school integration. While the
Court gave orders from above, the infantry on the ground—school officials,
legislators, and the American people—were engaged in a racial conundrum, trying
to find the best way to desegregate the nation. Powell’s theory and evidence on the
contrary raised the classic question: what came first, the racist school board or the
segregated neighborhood?
Segregated neighborhoods most likely affected
segregated schooling, but Powell downplayed school boards’ roles in actively
facilitating school segregation.
Despite Powell’s incorrect characterization of school board officials, his
assertion that there should be one uniform standard of detecting segregation for all
schools was correct.86 “[P]ublic school segregation exists to a substantial degree

82. John Egerton, Walking into History: The Beginning of School Desegregation in Nashville,
SOUTHERN SPACES (May 4, 2009), http://www.southernspaces.org/2009/walking-history-beginning-schooldesegregation-nashville.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. New Schools and Willis Wagons: Fight School Segregation!, UNIV. OF ILL.
http://www.uic.edu/depts/lib/specialcoll/services/rjd/CULExhibit/Urban%20League%20Exhibit/main.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2014).
86. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 232.
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[when] there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible
school board.”87 Figures were enough to show prima facie evidence, and the school
board must prove it operated under an integrated system.88 Segregative intent
should have been abandoned because it is impossible to discern, leads to
unpredictable outcomes, and provides little relevance to the existence of a
segregated school system.89 The effect of a system is significant; intent is
irrelevant. Powell’s argument for standard equality between the North and the
South revealed his pride in and loyalty to the South. Even though the South
egregiously resisted integration and the North secretly upheld segregation, it was
important for the Court to use equal standards and strike a balanced approach in
determining whether a school board engaged in segregation.
Next, Powell addressed the majority’s criticism that the ‘neighborhood school’
concept adopted in Keyes was maintained to facilitate segregation.90 Powell
believed the neighborhood school system offered many positive aspects to the
community: it strengthened the neighborhood, provided easy access to public
education, facilitated extracurricular activities, and fostered political support for
community issues.91 Moreover, the neighborhood concept’s national use validated
its constitutionality.92 After advocating the neighborhood concept, Powell
addressed his qualms with extensive busing regimes validated by Swann.93
According to Powell, busing destroyed the traditional connectedness of the home,
church and school life of children.94 He was not an advocate of busing, calling it
“[t]he single most disruptive element in education . . . .”95 He feared the anonymity
and rootlessness of city busing would destroy the sense of belonging found in the
community. With meticulous care, Powell argued that busing interfered with a
school board’s ultimate goal of producing quality education.96 Busing undermined
the validity of the neighborhood by placing economic burdens on the community’s
tax dollars and removing children from a familiar environment.97 Ordering a
school board to discontinue segregative acts correctly punished the school board,
but requiring the implementation of busing measures punished the students and
parents.98 Though busing purported to aid integration efforts, it frustrated the
purpose of Brown by augmenting the likelihood of segregation and exacerbating
white flight.99 Whites would leave the public school system and flee to the suburbs,
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 228, 236
Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 214.
JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285.
Id.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 248.
Id. at 246; see also JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253.
Id. See also JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285.
JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 249–50.
Id. at 256–58; see also JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 285–86.
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leaving poor whites and blacks to attend rotting city schools.100 Underlying his
opinion, Powell feared that busing would hurt the education system found in white
middle-class neighborhoods, similar to the ones he preserved while on the school
board. He was less concerned about the beneficial opportunities busing could
provide for inner city black students.101 According to Powell, the mixing of
deprived and poor black children with middle-class whites would taint the integrity
and compromise the educational environment of white schools.102 Aligning with
Powell’s grassroots theory and respect for states’ rights, he believed that school
officials should bear the responsibility for instituting corrective measures of
integration.
The state legislatures should facilitate education reform and
“communities deserve the freedom and the incentive to turn their attention and
energies to [the] goal of quality education, free from protracted and debilitating
battles over court-ordered student transportation.”103
Powell was very careful in framing his argument against busing because he
took a hands-off approach when faced with the dilemma of integrating Richmond
schools and was the sole white southerner on the Supreme Court.104 However, his
careful framing did not hide the holes in his argument. Divided communities could
not progress toward quality education in a time of racial turmoil and unrest, until
school boards began to seriously consider desegregation. Placing integration back
into the hands of a racially prejudiced school board that previously failed to
implement corrective measures was not a practical remedy. Where communities
have failed to take valid steps toward integration, the court provided solutions, such
as busing, to encourage lackadaisical school boards to move with expediency.
Moreover, Powell’s blind advocacy for the neighborhood system did not take into
account the practical realities and the context of American schools. “Just as a good
neighborhood tends to create and sustain a good school, a good school tends to
create and sustain a good neighborhood.”105 Therefore, a bad neighborhood tends
to create and sustain a bad school, and a bad school tends to create and sustain a bad
neighborhood. Neighborhood systems only positively affected good school
communities, and they negatively affected bad school communities.106 Many
school boards, including Boston’s, used the neighborhood concept to mask
segregative policies. In essence, the neighborhood system was de facto segregation
by another name and created another way for metropolitan areas to hide behind the
security of segregation.
In contrast with Justice Powell, Justice Marshall was a busing advocate, which

100. JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 286.
101. Id. at 285.
102. Id.
103. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253.
104. Id. at 253.
105. Kevin Fox Gotham, Missed Opportunities, Enduring Legacies: School Segregation and
Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 43 AMER. STUDIES 5, 30 (2002).
106. Id.
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was made clear in his dissent in Milliken v. Bradley.107 In Milliken, a federal
district court required Detroit, Michigan to implement a multidistrict busing remedy
after finding de jure segregation in the Detroit city schools. The busing remedy
would include fifty-three outlying districts that were not joined to the case. The
plaintiffs had not proven a constitutional violation in one district produced a
significant segregative effect in another, specifically the outlying districts.108 Due
to the influx of blacks in the inner city and the influx of whites in the Detroit
suburbs, enforcing a comprehensive desegregation plan solely for the city would
not integrate the public schools. In a five to four decision, the Court decided to
reverse the district court’s decision to enforce the multidistrict plan and remanded
the case to discuss a remedy for only integrating Detroit city schools—not suburban
schools.109
Using the precedent set forth in Swann, Marshall believed the district court
correctly required the State to implement the multi-district busing plan. It was
significant to include outlying suburban school districts because the State had a
duty to remedy the constitutional violation of segregated schools in any meaningful
fashion.110 The only available means to a constitutional end was the busing of
children in predominantly white suburbs to predominately black city schools and
vice versa. Marshall reiterated the State’s duty to “eliminate root and branch” racial
discrimination in public schools. Michigan could only accomplish integration of
Detroit by involving suburban school districts, and the majority’s limitation on the
remedy to city schools only would maintain a segregated system.111
Marshall’s second argument was two pronged: 1) the state of Michigan was
ultimately responsible for segregating public schools in Detroit; and 2) an intradistrict busing plan was not sufficient to carry out the State’s constitutional duty.112
Marshall criticized the majority’s emphasis on the local school boards’
independence and its requirement to prove the domino effect of unconstitutionality
from one district to another. According to Marshall, it was sufficient to implement
a remedial plan since the State engaged in de jure segregation by passing laws
prohibiting desegregation plans in 1970 and only disseminating transportation state
funds to suburban schools, not city schools. Though the State claimed the lack of
transportation funds for the city fostered the neighborhood concept, the State
conveniently implemented the neighborhood concept in segregated neighborhood
schools.113 These statewide actions were enough to show that the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated in city schools and suburban schools in Detroit.
Moreover, as agents of the State, local school boards were subject to State control,
107. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
108. Id. at 745.
109. Id. at 753.
110. Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 787 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that all the Detroit inner city schools contained
approximately seventy-five to ninety percent African American).
112. Id. at 791–92, 798–99.
113. Id. at 791–92.
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and Michigan could have consolidated the school districts to implement the plan.114
In regards to the second prong, the inclusion of outlying districts was not a ploy
to impose racial balancing but a necessary means to achieve desegregation.115
Moreover, the suburbs were very connected to the city proper. Therefore, it would
not be overwhelmingly burdensome to transport children from the city to the
suburbs, or vice versa.116 Providing equitable relief via busing was within the
court’s authority, since distance and time did not risk safety and health.117 Marshall
also addressed the economic issues Powell raised about busing in Keyes. Based on
the facts of Milliken, 1,800 buses were underutilized and could subsidize the nine
hundred buses needed to implement the multidistrict plan. In Marshall’s opinions,
he usually emphasized the significance of the facts of a particular case. Similarly,
Marshall stressed that the economic costs would be ameliorated since Michigan
owned unused buses.
Additionally, the majority misconstrued the principle that “the nature of the
violation determine[d] the scope of the remedy” too narrowly when it held that
including outlying districts exceeded the scope. Using his practical jurisprudence,
Marshall concluded that the “nature of a violation determined the scope of the
remedy simply because the function of any remedy is to cure the violation to which
it is addressed.”118 The remedy could not be narrowly construed at the risk of
effectiveness, and the majority transformed “a simple commonsense rule into a
cruel and meaningless paradox.”119
One statement in Marshall’s dissent
highlighted his deep veneration for litigation and how it could be used to improve
the racial divide:
The Court, in my view, does a great disservice to the District Judge
who labored long and hard with this complex litigation by accusing
him of changing horses in midstream and shifting the focus of this
case from the pursuit of a remedy for the condition of segregation
within the Detroit school system to some unprincipled attempt to
impose his own philosophy of racial balance on the entire Detroit
metropolitan area.120
The plan proposed by the District Court in Milliken would “help those children in
the city of Detroit whose educations and very futures have been crippled by
purposeful state segregation.”121 There was no reason to forfeit black students’
right to Equal Protection for integrated education due to malleable State procedures
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 796.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 804.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1971).
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 807 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 789–90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 812 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and the nonexistent issue of school board independence. Desegregation was a
difficult task, but the Court’s support of suburban white flight in Milliken was a step
backwards in the race to integration. The majority decision encouraged complacent
structuring of public schools in metropolitan areas and led to less aggressive means
of integrating public schools. It is not surprising that Powell joined the majority in
Milliken because he deferred to the actions of the school board.122 Powell would
say that the creation of neighborhood schools is a positive aspect to foster
community and belongingness, but Marshall would agree with Powell’s law clerk,
Jay Harvie Wilkinson III, who wrote that for too many blacks, their neighborhood
schools “‘meant confinement, a slow suffocation in the dankness of the ghetto. The
school bus might mean hope, escape, the door to a new life of challenge and
opportunity.’”123
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDUCATIONAL FUNDING PLANS
“It has simply never been within the constitutional prerogative of this Court to
nullify statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens
or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political
subdivisions in which citizens live.”
Justice Lewis Powell, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 1, 54 (1973).
“For on this record, it is apparent that the State’s purported concern with local
control is offered primarily as an excuse rather than as a justification for
interdistrict inequality.”
Justice Thurgood Marshall, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 126 (1973).
Justice Powell’s sympathy for school board officials and his deference to their
actions was noticeable in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.124
In Rodriguez, Texas adopted a dual system for financing public education by
extracting funds from local property taxes, State funds, and federal allotments.125
Plaintiffs argued that disparities in funding between affluent school districts and
poor districts were caused by stark differences in property taxes. For example, in
Edgewood Independent School District, the poor district where the plaintiffs
resided, there were 22,000 students, ninety percent who were of Mexican descent.
Edgewood’s property taxes contributed $26 per pupil in 1967; once the state and
federal funds were added, the district spent $356 per pupil. 126 In Alamo Heights
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 791 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
JEFFRIES, supra note 4 at 297.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 12.
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School District, the most affluent district in the city, there were 5,000 students,
most of which were Anglo-Saxon, with only eighteen percent Mexican residents.
Alamo Heights’ property taxes contributed $333 per pupil in 1967; once the state
and federal funds were added, the district spent $594 per pupil.127 The District
Court held that the financial scheme was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, but the Supreme Court reversed.128
According to the appellants, the financing system was unequal—the poor
districts did not contain the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility as
wealthy districts.129 Writing for the majority, Powell set up a two-part analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause to determine the plan’s constitutionality: 1)
whether the Texas financial system disadvantaged a suspect class or infringed upon
a fundamental implicit or explicit constitutional right requiring judicial scrutiny or
2) whether the plan rationally furthered some legitimate, articulated state purpose
and did not constitute invidious discrimination under the rationality standard of
review.130 In regards to the first prong, Powell ultimately concluded that the
system, based on relative wealth, was not enough to create a suspect class.131
Powell defined the “poor” as completely unable to pay for some desired benefit and
unable to sustain absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that
benefit.132 In Griffin v. Illinois,133 the Court held that a state law prohibiting
indigent criminal defendants from obtaining an appeal transcript was
unconstitutional because indigence revoked a fair opportunity to appeal.134 In
Douglas v. California,135 the right to appointed counsel on direct appeal was
granted to indigent defendants, who did not have resources to retrieve
representation.136 Those burdened by attorney payments or relatively less-wealthy
defendants were not classified as “poor” in Douglas.137 The plaintiffs in Rodriguez
were not considered “poor” because not receiving public education was different
from receiving a lower quality education, therefore absolute deprivation did not
exist.138 “[T]he Equal Protection Clause [did] not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages,” and the mere presence of inequality did not violate the

127. Id.
128. Id. at 6.
129. Id. at 50.
130. Id. at 17.
131. Id. at 19.
132. Id. at 20.
133. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
134. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 21.
135. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
136. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22.
137. Id. at 21–22. Powell also used Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that criminal
penalties cannot be given to indigents simply because they were totally unable to pay incarceration fines;
indigents did not include those who make relatively less money or those in which the fines are a heavy
burden) and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating Texas’ expensive filing fee for primary
elections, which barred potential candidates unable to pay access to the ballot).
138. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23.
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Constitution.139 Moreover, the Court could not assume that poor people lived in
poor districts, and Powell was unwilling to discuss the plaintiffs’ amorphous classes
based on family income or district wealth discrimination.140 Since a suspect class
did not exist and equal education based on relative wealth was not a guaranteed
right under the Constitution, strict scrutiny did not apply.
Under the second prong, Powell found the Texas plan rationally furthered a
legitimate, articulated state purpose and did not constitute invidious discrimination.
As a past school board official, Powell was familiar with the technicalities and
complex details that comprised funding schemes for school districts. The financial
plan in Rodriguez, like the neighborhood concept in Keyes, was widely used across
the country with “the Texas system [being] comparable to the systems employed in
virtually every other State.”141 Powell’s hands-off approach was also prevalent in
his discussion of the second prong, and he was vehemently against court imposition
on states’ rights. Justice Powell proclaimed that “the ultimate solutions [concerning
tax reform in school education] must come from the lawmakers and from the
democratic pressures of those who elect them.”142 The Court’s limited function
prohibited it from imposing “its judicial imprimatur on the status quo.”143 Through
the lens of a grassroots advocate, the Court would exceed the scope of the
Constitution if it struck down the financial plan. Supreme Court justices were not
experts in school funding systems and did not have superior wisdom of legislators,
scholars, and educational officials working diligently to better their communities.144
Marshall had a different view of Rodriguez than his southern colleague; he
found it unacceptable to submit the appellants to the “vagaries of the political
process,” which was unfit to provide a non-discriminatory remedy.145 In his
dissent, Marshall used the practical implications and historical context of the plan to
prove Texas violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The mission of the Minimum
Foundation School Program was to improve the finances of property poor districts
in relation to affluent districts. However, the state program failed to subsidize
despite the huge disparities in property taxes.146 Contrary to its mission, the
program gave the most affluent district, Alamo Heights, more money per pupil than
the poorer district, Edgewood. Alamo received three dollars more than Edgewood
in 1967, and by 1970 it received one hundred and thirty-five dollars more than
Edgewood. If variability in financing schemes were so significant as to affect
educational opportunity and inequality between races, then the financing system
reflected an intent to discriminate. Marshall defined the suspect class as
disadvantaged school children in Texas’ poor districts that received unequal
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 71 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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educational opportunities based on affluence.147
Marshall used the strict scrutiny standard instead of rationality review.
Traditionally, rationality applied to state discrimination of economic and
commercial instances because economic matters were usually far removed from
constitutional guarantees.148 However, the standard of review used in analyzing
state discrimination is higher “in light of the constitutional significance of the
interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular classification.”149 Based
on the historical background and marginalization of “discrete, powerless
minorities” by the financial system, Rodriguez warranted judicial strict scrutiny.150
Moreover, wealth discrimination cases were mostly attributable to the private
sector, but this case involved state economic discrimination, which was very
unusual. Therefore, careful review was imperative.151
The plaintiffs’ interest in Rodriguez was “fundamental” because education is a
fundamental interest recognized by the Court that directly correlates with one’s
ability to exercise their First Amendment rights and their right to vote.152 Many
rights are implicitly fundamental even though they are not explicitly written in the
Constitution. For instance, the rights to travel interstate and to vote in state
elections are fundamental rights.153 If state action hindered a fundamental interest
protected under the Constitution, then the state must show the action is “necessary
to promote a compelling government interest.”154 Discerning “fundamental”
interest is difficult, but the closer the interest is to a constitutional guarantee the
more fundamental it becomes.155 The education of pupils in Texas was
fundamental and closely related to constitutional guarantees of educational
opportunity.
Next, Marshall criticized the majority’s two-pronged classification for wealth
discrimination. He illustrated that in Harper, the Court struck down a $1.50 poll
tax in Virginia because it directly hindered one’s fundamental interest of
participating in state franchise. Moreover, the suspect class included those too poor
to afford the $1.50 and those who failed to pay.156 Additionally, the political
process was not a pertinent outlet for the disadvantaged because poor districts had
little voice to influence legislative redress compared to rich districts that favored the
status quo.157
Texas’ state interest in maintaining the financial scheme was to preserve local

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 112–15.
Id. at 99–100.
Id. at 100.
Id.at 102–103.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 123.
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educational control; but it was not enough to meet the “compelling” standard
according to Marshall. Describing it as “ephemeral character,” Marshall recognized
that local control intended to engage the community in educating its children.158
The idea that it takes a Village to raise a child was fostered in the local education
theme. However, when the financial plan created educational inequalities for
minorities, the Equal Protection Clause trumped the communal end.159 Marshall
most likely agreed with Powell in that the mere existence of inequality did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. However, Marshall believed the grave
inequalities of the financial scheme towards the students in poor districts violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell’s commonality argument—that many states
used similar plans—was not persuasive to Marshall because commonality did not
prove constitutionality. According to history, though nearly every State engaged in
segregation, it was still unconstitutional despite its normalness. Powell’s sympathy
for school officials and Marshall’s sympathy for marginalized minorities placed the
justices on opposite sides of Rodriguez due to their vastly different experiences.
IV. TRANSITIONING FROM INTEGRATION TO EQUALIZATION
Justice Marshall and Justice Powell wrote many opinions that affected the
realm of education. As society moved from an era of desegregation to an era of
rectification, the Court began to grapple with new legal issues. Using constitutional
text and valid precedent, the Supreme Court justices sought out to define the
meaning of “equality” considering the backdrop of past racial discrimination. In
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,160 the definition of equality began to take
shape. One could infer from its holding that legitimate expectations of seniority
trump integration efforts made by the teachers’ union. In Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, an affirmative action seniority system was implemented to protect
African American teachers from layoffs.161 Due to the history of racial
discrimination, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the Jackson
Board of Education and the Union included a caveat in Article XII which retained
less-senior minority individuals over more-senior white individuals to ensure “at no
time will there be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the
current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.”162
Each year, the employees reconsidered, voted, and approved the CBA.
Justice Powell, who wrote the majority, rejected the school board’s “role
model” theory, which claimed racial preferences were justified as a means of
remedying societal discrimination and providing African American children with

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 133.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 134.
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Id. at 270.
Id. (quoting Art. XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement).
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role models.163 The “role model” theory would justify the use of racial preferences
for eternity and remedies needed to discern a clear stopping point for preferential
treatment.164 Reliance on historical discrimination was outmoded and the country
was “long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose” to justify
racially preferential layoff practices.165 While quoting Swann,”[a]t some point
these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full compliance
with this Court’s decision in Brown I,” Powell seemed to suggest that the country
had completed its mission of integration, an overly optimistic and ill-judged
conclusion.166 He accused the district court and the school board of engaging in the
unconstitutional act of racial balancing, since “the affirmative duty to desegregate
ha[d] been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action [was]
eliminated from the system.”167
Under strict scrutiny, the majority held that the provision violated the
Fourteenth Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to accomplish the
State’s goal of remedying societal discrimination.168
The financial and
psychological effects of layoff were more burdensome than the effects of not being
hired.169 The timely investment to ensure job security, the legitimate expectations
that followed from a seniority system, and the dependence on certain wages were
aspects relied on by union workers. Powell’s use of psychologically based public
policy strayed from his usual style and resembled more of Marshall’s style of
opinion writing revealing Marshall’s influence on Powell’s jurisprudence.
Marshall’s dissent stressed the importance of viewing race-conscious
provisions within the context and the facts of the case. The issue was whether the
Constitution prohibited a union and school board from laying off minority teachers
to preserve the effects of the affirmative hiring policy put into place as an
“affirmative step[] to recruit, hire and promote minority group teachers . . . .”170
Since layoffs were necessary after two years of implementing the diversity hiring
policy, enforcing a strict seniority system would lay off all the African American
teachers and would essentially undo the integration of the teachers’ union.171 While
the union advocated for the strict seniority system and the school board proposed
freezing minority layoffs and placing the burden completely on white teachers, the
two entities compromised by forming Article XII.172
Using the reasonableness standard to analyze the provision, Marshall felt the
state’s legitimate goal to “eliminat[e] the pernicious vestiges of past discrimination”

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275–76.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 275–76.
Id. at 276.
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280.
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 298–99.
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was constitutional.173 Strict scrutiny only applied to cases involving fundamental
rights or suspect classifications and this case did not encompass either aspect.174 In
addition, the Court gives a considerable amount of deference to unions in creating
inventive seniority systems. In most union cases, the Court exudes “minimal
supervision” over substantive portions of collective bargaining agreements due to
the complicated structure of union contracts.175 Addressing Powell’s use of
psychological effects, Marshall noted that the unfairness associated with layoffs
should not be confused with the constitutionality of them.176 If a legitimate state
purpose existed and eighty percent of the white union members reconsidered and
signed the agreement six times, then the provision is constitutional.177 Lastly,
Marshall criticized the majority for not providing an alternative solution to Article
XII. The provision was the narrowest and most equitable because it enforced a
seniority system and preserved minority representation simultaneously.178
In Wygant, Powell adopted certain aspects of Marshall’s jurisprudence and
Marshall adopted specific characteristics of Powell’s jurisprudence. Usually,
Marshall used social science to expand his constitutional arguments. However,
Powell used social science to enhance his argument that an employee’s reliance on
a seniority system trumped the racial preference regime implemented by the
teachers’ union. On the other hand, Powell usually advocated for the freedom of
school officials to act autonomous without court intervention. However, Marshall
used the theory of autonomy to justify the union’s actions in Wygant. Powell
imposed Court intervention despite the usual deference given to unions and the
employees’ actively contracting for the inclusion of Article XII. Each Justice’s
perspective depended on the interests he sought to protect. Powell empathized the
rights “innocent” white tenured workers who relied on job security despite their
benefit from a historically exclusionary system. Conversely, Marshall sympathized
with the black marginalized worker who was hired last due to past discriminatory
policies and could not obtain the job security given to the white tenured workers
because the opportunity to join the teachers’ union was not an option for black
teachers pre-1980.
The legal issues surrounding affirmative action programs have caused much
contention in the American courts and continue to be at the forefront of policy
discussions. After the fifty-ninth anniversary of Brown, affirmative action
programs in college admissions have received considerable attention by the courts,
media, and policy makers. Unsurprisingly, Justice Powell’s and Justice Marshall’s
differing opinions on affirmative action as shown in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, revealed interesting insights about their jurisprudence and
173. 476 U.S. at 301.
174. Id. at 301–302.
175. Id. at 311 (quoting Amer. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 76–77 (1982) & Cal. Brewers
Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 608 (1980)).
176. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 296.
177. Id. at 299.
178. Id. at 301.
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experiences. If the two Justices were still on the bench, what would they say about
affirmative action in today’s world? How would they decide Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin?
V. BAKKE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE MODERN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
“It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater
than that accorded others.”
Justice Lewis Powell, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 295 (1978).
“In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the
lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should
be a state interest of the highest order.”
Justice Thurgood Marshall, Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 396 (1978).
Regents of University of California v Bakke,179 a pivotal case in American
constitutional history, set the precedent for affirmative action college admissions
programs and shaped the constitutional arguments that would influence the holding
of many future cases. In Bakke, the University of California Davis Medical School
implemented a special admissions program to increase the number of disadvantaged
students.180 The special admissions program worked concurrently with the regular
admissions process to determine the students of the incoming class.181 All minority
applications—African American, Asian American, American Indian, and Mexican
American—as well as applications marked as economically or educationally
disadvantaged were sent to the special admissions program.182 Special admissions
interviewed one out of five applicants and did not require a minimum grade point
average (“GPA”) or compare the top candidates to the general admissions
applicants.183 There were no disadvantaged whites admitted under the special
admissions program but there were significant increases in the admission rates for
blacks and Mexican Americans as compared to minorities accepted through general
admissions.184 As a screening mechanism in the regular admissions program, a 2.5
179. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
180. Id. at 272.
181. Id. at 274–75.
182. Id. at 274.
183. Id. at 275.
184. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275 (The special admissions program accepted twenty one black students, thirty
Mexican Americans, and twelve Asian Americans; the general admissions program accepted one black
student, six Mexican American, and thirty-seven Asian American. Note the acceptance of Asian Americans
were mostly under the general admission. The amount of minority general acceptances may have been
skewed based on the number of minority applicants who applied to the general admissions and those who
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GPA was required and one out of six applicants were interviewed. Bakke was
denied admission twice through the general admissions program though he received
a high interview score and there were seats open in the special admissions program
when he was rejected. Some applicants admitted through the special program had
lower GPAs, interview scores, and Medical College Admission Test (“MCAT”)
scores than the plaintiff.185
The plaintiff challenged the special admissions program because it functioned
as a racial quota and guaranteed disadvantaged minorities sixteen seats in the
incoming class.186 Using the strict scrutiny standard, the Court held that the special
admissions program was unconstitutional because it functioned as an unlawful
quota system and directed the medical school to admit Bakke.187 Powell
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause was founded during historically
troubling times. However, he expressed that in 1978, a more textual approach
should be taken to ensure that all persons regardless of race received equal
protection under the law.188 Therefore, Powell discarded the two-class theory on
the basis that the country had moved past racial discriminatory times and that it was
unfair to offer racial preferences to minorities when whites did not receive special
treatment.189
To justify the use of a suspect class, the State had to show the purpose was
constitutional, substantial, and necessary to accomplish the goal.190 The special
admissions program had four main goals: 1) to reduce the underrepresentation of
minorities in the medical profession, 2) to counter societal discrimination, 3) to
increase physicians serving in underserved areas, and 4) to foster ethnic diversity in
the student body.191 Powell undermined each goal and concluded that it was not
necessary for a suspect class to receive special treatment at the expense of others.
The first goal of ameliorating underrepresentation of minorities as imposing a quota
based solely on race, which was per se unconstitutional.192 The medical school’s
second goal of countering societal discrimination was nebulous and too broad to
justify class.193 According to Powell, it “impose[d] disadvantages upon persons
like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of

applied to the special program. The number of Asian Americans accepted under the general admissions
program may show that more Asians applied under the general admission and did not consider themselves
“disadvantaged.” The Court does not address this phenomenon, but it is interesting to note since statistics can
often be tailored to frame a point in particular ways.).
185. Id. at 277 (The record did not reflect how many students admitted through general admissions had
lower scores.).
186. Id. at 279.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 289.
189. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-98.
190. Id. at 305.
191. Id. at 306.
192. Id. at 307.
193. Id.
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the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.”194 The third goal,
based on the university’s assumption that minority students will practice medicine
in underserved, predominately minority communities, was not properly supported
because the medical school did not provide information showing that minority
students had this goal in mind.195 The lack of evidence and the broad assumption
was insufficient to justify the suspect class. Ethnic diversity, the last goal of the
university, was constitutionally acceptable; however Powell noted that race could
only be one factor in the admissions process, not the sole deciding factor for
admitting a student.196 Even though Powell and Marshall agreed that diversity
could be a factor in the admissions process, Marshall did not completely agree with
the majority and wrote a separate dissent expressing his arguments for upholding
the constitutionality of the special admissions program.197
While Powell used a textualist approach to interpret the Equal Protection
Clause, Marshall used a historical contextual approach. Racial discrimination
against blacks ensued for more than three hundred years in America and the state’s
interest in rectifying such wrongs and improving the underrepresentation of
minorities in the medical field was constitutionally valid.198 In the beginning of his
dissent, Marshall laid out Negro history beginning with slavery.199
The
proclamation that “all men are created equal” only applied to white men. Just as the
British oppressively reigned over the thirteen colonies, whites in America repeated
history by oppressively reigning over blacks. Justice Marshall emphasized the
many cases that enhanced the unfortunate theme of Negro inferiority, especially the
Civil Rights cases200 and Plessy v. Ferguson. He quoted Justice Harlan, the sole
dissenter in Plessy, stating that “separate but equal” really meant “colored citizens
[were] so inferior and degraded that they [could not] be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens.”201 Even in 1978, African Americans were not
equal to their white peers mainly because centuries of unequal treatment were
ingrained in the American way of life. The unemployment rate for blacks was
twice that of whites despite their small population.202 Moreover, Bakke was
decided a mere twenty-four years after Brown held that integration of all schools
was necessary. Twenty-four years was not enough to overturn three hundred and
fifty years of segregation, so the medical school’s interest of ensuring diversity
made the special admissions program constitutional.
Based on legislative intent, Marshall argued that the Fourteenth Amendment

194. Id. at 310.
195. Id. at 310–11.
196. Id. at 311–12.
197. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 388–90.
199. Id. at 388.
200. The Civil Rights cases held that Congress lacked authority under the Equal Protection Clause to
outlaw racial discrimination by private entities.
201. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
202. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 395.
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was enacted to grant Negroes a chance to succeed and to remedy the effects of
discrimination.203 It logically followed that the implementation of race-conscious
measures may be necessary to ensure equality especially since white resistance was
still prevalent in society.204 The intent of the Framers was to promote equality
based on the context of reality, not on an abstract equality grounded in the untrue
premise that racial divide no longer existed in educational institutions. In Plessy,
the Court upheld many race conscious state actions. Swann held that school boards
could consider race in assigning school zones and United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey 205 held that New York’s reapportionment plan, which gave more power to
Negros and Puerto Ricans in the district, therefore precedent supported the
constitutionality of the special admissions program based on race.206 These cases
supported remedial measures for groups who were victims to past discrimination
despite that effect on “innocent” individuals.
According to Powell, if the two-class theory prevailed, the Court would have to
evaluate prejudicial experience of various minorities, but Marshall disagreed.207
Blacks should not have to prove their suffering because racism’s enduring effects
still pervaded blacks’ lives. Even though Marshall sat on the highest court of the
land, he knew many blacks still attended racially divided schools and received less
educational opportunities than their white peers. As a man who personally
experienced racial discrimination, he knew that community practice did not dictate
the racial equality granted by law. Justice Powell iterated that many disadvantaged
whites in the world did not receive preferential treatment in the same way as
minorities. Marshall articulated that the difference between disadvantaged whites
and minorities was discriminatory history.208 The plight of poor whites was
detrimental and difficult, however the plight of the poor black or Hispanic
individual was more detrimental because the minority received even fewer
opportunities than the disadvantaged white person. The legacy of unequal
treatment closed the door to Negro opportunities to hold positions of influence,
affluence, and prestige. In conclusion, Marshall found that the Court had come full
circle: from the detriment of Plessy and the Civil Rights cases to the triumph of
Brown and affirmative action cases and back to hindering programs implemented to
ensure the equality of educational opportunities for minorities.209
Bakke’s influence continues to resonate in modern cases. It was extensively
cited to in Grutter v. Bollinger,210 where the Court in a five to four decision held
that the University of Michigan Law School’s race conscious admission policy was
constitutional. Diversity was a compelling state interest improving diverse
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 398–99.
Id.
430 U.S. 144 (1977).
Id.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 296-97.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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perspectives, enhanced professionalism in preparing students to interact with
individuals with different views and fostered civic engagement.211 Currently, the
Supreme Court is reviewing an affirmative action case, Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin,212 which has sparked a plethora of interest and warranted much
media attention. Affirmative action cases tend to be very close decisions and
Fisher will likely follow the trend. Reflecting on Powell’s and Marshall’s
jurisprudences, this analysis will predict their opinions in Fisher.
In Fisher, two white women were denied admissions to the university and they
challenged the constitutionality of the admissions policy. The two women alleged
that they were discriminated based on race and should have been admitted because
they were more qualified than admitted diverse candidates.213 The Western District
of Texas granted summary judgment to the university and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. Under strict scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit held that the race
conscious admissions policy was constitutional and aided the university’s
compelling interest to achieve diversity.
The Texas legislature enacted the race neutral “Top 10% Law,” where the
University of Texas (“UT”) automatically granted admission to all students in the
top ten percent of their high school class.214 After the enactment of the statute, the
2004 freshman class admitted 4.5% African Americans, 16.9% Hispanics, and
17.9% Asian Americans.215 Even though there was an increase in minority
representation, ninety percent of small classes—ranging from five to twenty-four
students—contained only one or zero African Americans, forty-three percent had
one or zero Hispanic students and forty-six percent had one or zero Asian American
students.216 In response to this underrepresentation, UT adopted the Personal
Achievement Index (“PAI”) which took a holistic approach to admissions by
rewarding students based on scores on two essays, leadership extracurricular
activities, work experience, community service, socioeconomic status, race, and
ethnicity.217
Since the Top 10% Law increased minority enrollment, the appellants argued
that it created a critical mass and the adoption of the PAI unnecessarily and
unconstitutionally pursued racial balancing.218 According to Grutter, percentage
plans that happen to increase diversity cannot replace race-conscious programs
because the percentage does not assess applicants on an individual basis.219 Even

211. Id. at 307.
212. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011).
213. Id. at 217.
214. Id. at 227.
215. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224.
216. Amicus Brief for the United States at 6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.
2011) (No. 09-50822).
217. Amicus Brief for the United States at 4–7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.
2011) (No. 09-50822).
218. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 234.
219. Id. at 239.
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though the legislature thought this rule would increase minority admissions, the
percentage plan does not embody the holistic view adopted in Grutter. Therefore,
the “Top 10% Law” cannot replace a race conscious program implemented to
achieve diversity and select people with unique perspectives, different experiences,
and dynamic backgrounds.
Appellants also argued that the Top 10% Law reached a critical mass.
Comparing enrollment numbers of Michigan Law School in Grutter, which ranged
from 13.5 to 20.1 percent to UT’s admission of forty percent of African Americans,
Hispanics, and Asian Americans, the appellants claimed that UT exceeded the
necessity of critical mass.220 The Court rejected this because the appellants used
the percentage range as a quota in determining critical mass.221 Grutter did not tie
critical mass to a specific number. Just as affirmative action programs cannot
implement quotas that reserve a specified number of minority seats, those
challenging the programs cannot cap the number of minority seats at a specific
number. Moreover, the Court would not allow the plaintiffs to lump together
minority groups because lumping was held unconstitutional in Parents Involved.222
Each minority must be analyzed separately to discern whether the university’s
diversity goals have been achieved. The Fifth Circuit found that the aggregate
percentage skewed the existence of diversity because minorities were grouped in
specific departments, and did not represent a critical mass for the university as a
whole.223 Appellants claimed the PAI was not narrowly tailored and had a minimal
effect on diversity substantially reached by the Top 10% Law. However, the
Grutter-like system was not impermissible after the exhaustion of race neutral
alternatives. Small gains in diversity were not reason enough to ban a raceconscious program.
Additionally, the mere fact that appellants had higher grades than diverse
candidates admitted in the top ten percent of their high school was not cogent.
Competition was much more intense for those who were not in the top ten percent.
In 2008, ninety-two percent of Texas residents were admitted under the Top 10%
Law, therefore non-top ten percent applicants filled the remaining eight percent.224
Often times, non-top ten applicants have higher SAT scores than automatically
granted students, regardless of race, to help set them apart from a very large
applicant pool.225 Consequently, the heavy emphasis placed on the academic
qualifications of non-top ten applicants adversely affected minority applicants

220. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (No. 11345).
221. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 243.
222. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
223. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 245.
224. Amicus Brief for the United States at 8, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.
2011) (No. 09-50822). See also Interview with Sheldon Nahmod, Professor at the Chicago Kent College of
Law (May 4, 2013), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/more.
225. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 241.
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because nationally, they have lower SAT scores than whites.226 Even though the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court, it did so with caution, saying that the PAI
should not be implemented in perpetuity. Since the Top 10% Law augmented the
number of Texans admitted—in 1998, the law accounted for forty-one percent of
Texas admits and in 2008, eighty-one percent of admits—the necessity of using
race in admission policies may deteriorate based on racial demographics.227 In
Grutter, Justice O’Connor also addressed the perpetuity issue stating that the race
conscious admissions program at Michigan’s Law School would be phased out
within twenty-five years.228
To predict Powell’s Fisher opinion, the analysis will apply the framework in
Bakke and apply it to the facts of this case. Similar to the lower courts, Powell
would use strict scrutiny to analyze UT’s use of race in its admissions process. To
justify the use of a suspect class, the State must show the purpose is constitutional,
substantial, and necessary to accomplish the goal. PAI had four main goals: 1) to
foster ethnic diversity in the student body, 2) to promote cross racial understanding,
3) to prepare students for the workforce, and 4) to break down stereotypes.229
Powell would find the first goal of ethnic diversity constitutionally acceptable.
However, Powell may be skeptical of the second goal of promoting cross-racial
understanding and the fourth goal of breaking down stereotypes because they are
nebulous concepts, similar to the goals in Bakke, which purported to counteract
societal discrimination. Unlike the university in Bakke, UT does not ground its
goals in assumptions and on its face, the program seems constitutional because race
is amongst many factors in making admissions decisions and because there were
not a specific number of seats set aside for minority students. In the analysis,
Powell would have to discern if diverse Texas applicants received special treatment
at the expense of the plaintiffs in Fisher or if the plaintiffs were mere applicants
that fell prey to fierce competition. Since the PAI resembles Grutter’s holistic
approach, Powell’s deep respect for precedent may lead him to affirm the Fifth
Circuit. However, Powell had an overly optimistic view of the progress of race
relations and by 2013, he may assume that race-conscious programs are no longer
necessary. Based on a textual approach, he may reverse the Fifth Circuit because
the top ten percent is sufficient in admitting minority students. He would agree
with O’Connor that the Court must draw a line when considering the
constitutionality of racial preference.
The Ghost of Marshall Past would analyze Fisher using the historical context
and practical realities of modern day racial relations and would hold UT’s program
constitutional. If the Court decided the affirmative action program at UT was
unconstitutional, Marshall would find that the Court had come full circle once
again: from the detriment of Bakke, to the triumph of Grutter, and back to hindering
226. Id.
227. Id. at 246–47.
228. Id. at 222.
229. Amicus Brief for the United States at 7, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir.
2011) (No. 09-50822).
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affirmative action programs still necessary in providing educational opportunities to
minorities. If Marshall were still living, he would view practical realities of today
and conclude that the nation is far from achieving racial equality. Hate crimes
remain commonplace in Southern states like Mississippi,230 and Alabama recently
in 2000 updated its state law to allow interracial marriages.231 In 2011, a church in
Kentucky would not wed an interracial couple and in 2010, a justice of the peace
denied a marriage license to an interracial couple.232 It is clear that our society has
not transitioned completely into racial equality and the idea of black inferiority
continues to plague the minds of the American people. The discriminatory history
of minorities is a driving source of grave race relations and therefore, diversity and
ensuring education benefits for minorities are still compelling interests that deserve
protection.
Marshall would find the perpetuity argument unpersuasive and reject
O’Connor’s overly optimistic dicta that affirmative action programs will not be
needed in twenty-five years. Unfortunately, the modern day African American is
still viewed as inferior by many Americans. To reverse nearly three hundred and
fifty years of racial divide in such a small amount of time is impractical. Grutter
occurred forty-nine years after the Brown decision and twenty-five years from the
Grutter decision is 2028—nearly seventy-five years after the Brown decision and
merely fifteen years from now. Marshall would not believe that seventy-five years
of slow-moving progress could reverse nearly so many years of racial segregation.
“Old habits die hard” and it will take centuries to improve racial relations in
America.
CONCLUSION
Both Justice Powell and Justice Marshall expressed deep veneration for
education. They recognized its ability to unlock the doors of success and expand
one’s horizons beyond the boundaries of apathy. Though the Justices influenced
education in different ways and often had opposing views, their unique
jurisprudences were essential in moving the ball forward to educational reform.
According to Powell, American politics relied too much on judges’ ability to decide
great social issues.233 On a grassroots level, community leaders should determine
solutions for the problems that plague society, not nine robed judges.

230. Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Life Sentence in Mississippi Hate-Crime Case, CNN, (Mar. 22,
2012, 5:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/21/justice/mississippi-hate-crime.
231. Interracial Marriage: Many Deep South Republican Voters Believe Interracial Marriage Should Be
Illegal, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:31 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/12/interracialmarriage-deep-south_n_1339827.html.
232. Interracial Couple Denied Marriage License By Louisiana Justice of the Peace, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 18, 2010 6:12 AM) ,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/15/interracial-coupledenied_n_322784.html (last updated May 5, 2011 3:20 PM).
233. TIMOTHY J. O’NEILL, BAKKE & THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: FRIENDS AND FOES IN THE CLASSROOM
OF LITIGATION 254 (Wesleyan University Press) (1985).

STEPHENSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

60

8/11/14 7:49 PM

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE [Vol. 28

Marshall believed the Court was a stimulant in motivating communities to act.
Litigation was used as a tool to challenge social wrongs when the marginalized
became complacent with the status quo and when local authorities inadequately
addressed social ills. Even though defining equality resembled a game of tug of
war, the justices presented both sides of the argument diligently and laudably. To
much avail, their jurisprudence reflected their background experiences. Their two
worlds merged while on the bench and each learned something from the other: the
Southern white gentleman learned to appreciate the positive change brought by
judicial decisions and the Southern black gentleman learned to recognize the
community’s significance in transforming law into action.

